Internet-based business-to-business platforms involve a buyer side transacting with a seller side, both of which are customers of an intermediary platform firm. Dyadic viewpoints implicit in conventional theories of customer orientation thus must be modified to apply to a triadic relationship system (seller-platform-buyer) in platform settings. The authors propose that customer orientation of platform firms consists of total customer orientation (customer orientation toward both the buyer and seller sides) and customer orientation asymmetry (customer orientation in favor of the seller relative to the buyer side) and examine the antecedents and consequences of these orientations. Data from 109 business-to-business electronic platforms reveal that buyer-(seller-) side concentration increases total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers (buyers). These positive effects are weaker when buyers and sellers interact directly (two-sided matching) versus indirectly (one-sided matching) and are stronger when the offering prices vary (dynamic price discovery) versus remain stable (static price discovery) during negotiations. Finally, total customer orientation increases platform performance by itself and in interaction with customer concentration, but orientation asymmetry increases performance only in conjunction with customer concentration.
B
usiness-to-business (B2B) exchange is often conducted through e-commerce platforms that provide the infrastructure to facilitate interactions between user firms in so-called multisided markets (Dagenais and Gautschi 2002; Jap 2003) . Multisided electronic markets involve an Internet-based intermediary platform firm that must attract two or more groups of users that occupy distinct functional roles (e.g., buyers and sellers) and "value each other's participation onboard the same platform to generate any economic value" (Silverthorne 2006 ). For example, as Figure 1 illustrates, businesses such as eBay and Ariba must attract both buyers and sellers for their continued existence; without participation from either side, these platforms would be defunct (Cennamo and Santalo 2013; Mittal and Sawhney 2001) . 1 Thus, multisided platforms are distinct from traditional B2B relationships, in which the interaction between different sides is not a condition for value generation; for example, Ford's suppliers are not viewed as its customers or required to interact with Ford's customers (i.e., automobile buyers).
Our research focuses on such two-sided 2 B2B electronic platforms (or electronic marketplaces) that connect seller firms and buyer firms and enable them to negotiate and transact; for example, Tradeford.com brings together automotive equipment suppliers (seller side) and automobile manufacturers (buyer side). The U.S. Census Bureau (2012) recognizes the importance of B2B electronic platforms for economic growth and notes that B2B e-commerce in the United States has increased from sales of less than $.5 trillion in 2001 to $1.6 trillion in 2004 and $3.7 trillion in 2010. A wide range of industries engage in B2B e-commerce through electronic platforms, including automobiles (18% 1 Multisided markets differ from multiple customer segments, in which all customer segments are buyers. For example, Coca-Cola sells to both businesses and individuals, but both segments are buyers to Coca-Cola. In contrast, platforms have distinct seller and buyer sides, characterized by demand externalities such that a greater number of participants on one side attracts participants on the other side. No such direct externalities exist among the multiple customer segments of Coca-Cola. 2 We consider only B2B platforms on which actors external to the platform firm can trade. We exclude private exchanges (e.g., virtual private networks, company websites) and exclusively business-tocustomer platforms. Platforms are also distinct from direct channels, which involve an upstream seller that supplies directly to the downstream customer without any intermediary and whose core purpose is to economize by eliminating the intermediary (e.g., Anderson et al. 2001) . Platform-based exchange, by definition, involves a key intermediary-namely, the platform. The term "platform" is also used for product architectures or technologies (Gawer and Cusumano 2008) , such as Intel's x86 processor architecture, but we use it strictly to describe a market maker that brings different sides of a marketplace together for exchange. Finally, our usage of the term "B2B platforms" incorporates other similar terms such as online marketplaces; yield managers; and maintenance, repair, and operations/ catalog hubs (Gallaugher and Ramanathan 2002, p. 53). and 61% of platform executives view customer management as their top priority (Oracle 2011) . 3 Customer management on B2B platforms differs from that in dyadic relationships as typically studied in marketing. In a dyadic exchange, a manufacturer procures components from upstream suppliers, integrates them into its final products, and sells the products to downstream buyers; buyers are the only customers of the manufacturer. In contrast, a B2B platform is a triadic exchange system involving a seller side, a buyer side, and the intermediary platform (Hagiu and Wright 2013) . The platform's role is to attract and retain quality participants on both sides, so it faces a complex customer management task. First, the platform must exhibit its customer orientation toward both sides because its success depends on continued patronage by both (Evans 2008) . Second, as is true of any interfirm system (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006; Shervani, Frazier, and Challagalla 2007) , the platform and its customers are interdependent, which influences the platform's customer orientation. When confronted by powerful actors on one side of the market, for example, a platform might opt to exhibit differential levels of customer orientation toward the two sides of its market.
From these two complexities, we propose a twodimensional conceptualization of customer orientation that consists of total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry. Total customer orientation is the extent to which a platform firm engages in efforts to understand, serve, and satisfy its customers, irrespective of their affiliation with buyer or seller sides. It thus reflects the premise that a platform must satisfy the needs of both buyers and sellers, which are both customers of the platform (Hagiu 2007; Rochet and Tirole 2006) . In contrast, customer orientation asymmetry is the extent to which the platform firm understands, serves, and satisfies one customer side more than the other; this factor captures the possibility that some platforms focus their customer efforts more on one side of the marketplace than on the other side.
FIGURE 1 Conventional and Platform-Based B2B Exchange
To study the antecedents and consequences of this proposed customer orientation structure, we rely on powerdependence theories pertaining to interfirm relationships (Frazier 1983; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) . We describe how platforms manage their dependence on powerful buyers (and sellers) both by appeasing the powerful partners (i.e., offering greater transaction utilities directly to the powerful side) and by balancing their dependence on the powerful partners (i.e., by bonding with the other side of the marketplace to countervail the powerful side) (e.g., Emerson 1962) . For antecedents, we hypothesize that platform firms nurture their total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry in accordance with their perceived dependence (captured as customer concentration) on both sides of the market. Consistent with broader B2B research (e.g., Ghosh, Dutta, and Stremersch 2006; Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) , we also posit that certain attributes of platform-based exchange process, such as uncertainty and switching costs, moderate the effect of a platform's dependence on its customer orientation. In terms of consequences, we posit that both components of platform customer orientation support platform performance, contingent on the dependence considerations at hand. A unique field study of U.S.-based B2B platforms largely supports our hypotheses.
Business-to-business platforms are proliferating, but research in marketing on this topic has only just begun to emerge (e.g., Kaplan and Sawhney 2000; Grewal, Chakravarty, and Saini 2010; Sridhar et al. 2011) . Our research contributes to the body of marketing literature by describing platform firms' customer practices. Although customer orientation is elemental to any exchange and represents "a central doctrine" (Lusch and Laczniak 1987, p. 1) in marketing, it remains unexplored for platform firms (Gawer and Cusumano 2008; Rochet and Tirole 2006) . Our research also adds to the interfirm relationships literature by highlighting the relevance of power-dependence theories for customer orientation in platform-based exchange. Limited extant research on platforms, which has appeared primarily in the field of economics, has focused almost exclusively on pricing issues and adopts analytical approaches (e.g., Chakravorti and Roson 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006) . In contrast, we (1) describe the complex interplay of a platform's customer management efforts and theoretically salient attributes of the platform-based exchange process (i.e., platform attributes) and (2) use unique real-world data to test how this interplay influences platform performance. For practitioners, we also describe how and when customer orientation creates value in platform-based exchange (Kirca, Jayachandran, and Bearden 2005; ). An IBM Institute for Business Value (1999) study affirms the utility of such recommendations by noting that the key challenge facing B2B platforms is managing tradeoffs across customer sides while providing superior customer experiences.
Customer Orientation Structure / 3
In the next section, we describe platform-based exchange and propose a customer orientation framework for platform firms. We then discuss the antecedents and performance consequences of these elements and present our hypotheses. Then, we describe our research methodology and findings before closing with a discussion of the implications of our research.
Conceptual Background

Platform Firms and Traditional B2B Exchange
As depicted in Figure 1 and described in Table 1 , several critical differences exist between platform-based exchange and traditional B2B exchange. First, a traditional B2B supply chain comprises an upstream manufacturer, an intermediary distributor (or dealer), and a downstream buyer or end customer (e.g., a small business). In this vertical chain, the needs of the common buyer promote alignment between the interests of the manufacturers and distributors. In contrast, B2B platforms lack a common buyer for all the involved parties, which makes such interest alignment inherently challenging. Second, the distributor manages the upstream and downstream relationships as two distinct dyadic relationships; even if the two relationships influence each other indirectly (Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) , the upstream seller (i.e., manufacturer) and the downstream buyer do not typically transact or interact directly. In contrast, platformbased exchange relationships are triadic in that the platform serves only as a go-between, enabling the buyer and seller sides to interact directly with each other. Economic value is created only through interaction between the sides (Hagiu 2007) . Thus, a core benefit that each side seeks from the platform is access to participants on the other side; the presence of quality buyers (sellers) motivates sellers (buyers) to transact, but a lack of sellers (buyers) could drive buyers (sellers) away from the platform (Evans 2008) . Thus, both sides are customers of the platform, which must cultivate customer orientation toward both sides.
Third, the buyer and seller sides of a platform feature distinct characteristics. For example, a dominant (powerful) side might demand more favorable exchange terms from the platform relative to the less powerful side (Archer and Gebauer 2000) . As such, the platform must decide purposefully whether to invest in different levels of customer orientation toward the two sides of the marketplace. Such complications are not present in conventional exchange.
Fourth, in conventional dyadic exchange, a manufacturer itself identifies, vets, and manages its distributors (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992; Wathne and Heide 2004) . Platform participants instead rely on the platform to screen, recruit, and manage a qualified pool of participants (Pavlou and Majchrzak 2002) . Lacking direct control over the quality of the participant pool, participants likely experience substantial ambiguity regarding a partner's abilities and motivations, particularly if participants on one side of the platform cannot communicate directly with the other side (i.e., socalled one-sided exchange). In focusing its customer orientation efforts, the platform must account for such platformlevel attributes, such as whether the exchange at hand is one-sided.
Finally, in a conventional dyadic B2B exchange, the distributor has multiple avenues it can use to manage customers, such as servicing, product pricing, and promotional actions (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007) . Within a platform context, however, the intermediary (platform) has no direct involvement in or control over production, pricing, or service decisions. Thus, customer orientation efforts offer one of the few avenues platforms can apply to retain their customers.
Customer Orientation of Platform Firms
Following extant research (e.g., Jaworski and Kohli 1993), we define customer orientation as the extent to which a platform aims to understand, serve, and satisfy customers' (buyers' and sellers') needs. In our context of B2B platform firms, customer orientation behaviors involve tailoring trading interfaces, technical help lines, and work flow support systems to meet the specific needs of buyers and sellers in a given industry (Archer and Gebauer 2000) . To delineate platform customer orientation, we rely on relationship marketing constructs such as interfirm dependence (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) to propose two distinct components of customer orientation: total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry.
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Total customer orientation is the extent to which the behavior of a platform firm is geared toward understanding, serving, and satisfying the needs of both buyers and sellers. This notion assesses the platform's orientation toward both buyers and sellers collectively and reflects a view of platform relationships as an "interdependent" (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995, p. 348 ) exchange system. Interdependence arises because the platform relies on both buyers and sellers for revenues, so it must maintain customer orientations toward and provide transaction efficiencies to both sides (Bakos 1991; Wang and Benaroch 2004) . Because the appeal of a platform to a prospective participant on each side depends partly on the quality of the trading partners on the other side (Evans and Schmalensee 2010) , platforms must cultivate customer orientations toward both sides. Customer orientation asymmetry, in contrast, is the extent to which a platform firm understands, serves, and satisfies one customer side (e.g., sellers) more than the other side (e.g., buyers). To conceptualize this construct, we draw on marketing research suggesting that interfirm dependence, which motivates firms to engage with customers in the first place, can entail asymmetric positions on the part of the firms involved. Gupta and Lehmann (2005) argue that various customers offer differing "[performance] value" to a firm, which should be factored into the firm's customer orientation decisions. More specifically, different sides of a platform exhibit distinct characteristics Interest alignment Interests of the manufacturer and distributor are easier to align; the needs of the ultimate buyer (end customer) at the end of the value chain facilitates such alignment.
There is no common end customer for the involved parties, which makes interest alignment more challenging.
Buyer-seller interactions Direct interaction between manufacturer and the buyer is neither routine nor necessary for value creation. Instead, the parties transact with the intermediary distributor.
Buyer-and seller-side participants must interact directly to create value.
Role of intermediary Distributor buys finished goods and spare parts from the manufacturer, (potentially) adds value to it (through, e.g., parts installation, servicing, operational advice), and sells the final offering to the buyer. The intermediary distributor participates in and/or influences product pricing; quality; and manufacturing, shipping, and service decisions.
Platforms do not manufacture, integrate, service, or take resale rights to the products in question, nor do they directly influence product pricing or quality decisions.
Manufacturers (sellers) and customers (buyers) do not routinely deal directly with each other and do not need to vet each other firsthand.
Buyers and sellers deal directly in exchange but must rely on the platform to secure the quality of the trading pool. Ceteris paribus, they face greater uncertainty regarding the quality of potential exchange partners.
Implications for customer orientation Customer orientation only toward downstream buyer. Customer orientation toward both buyer and seller sides, involving both total and asymmetric orientation components.
TABLE 1 Comparison of Conventional B2B and Platform-Based Exchange
(e.g., dependence on the platform), which might dictate different levels of the platform's customer efforts (Pavlou and El-Sawy 2002) . Prior research in marketing (e.g., Anderson et al. 2001; Anderson and Jap 2005) and information systems (Chatterjee and Ravichandran 2004; Dagenais and Gautschi 2002) has agreed that a firm's willingness to invest resources in an interfirm relationship increases as the focal partner becomes more dependent on it and, therefore, becomes easier to manage. A platform thus might orient itself more toward the side of the market on which it is less dependent.
As an example of an asymmetrically oriented platform, consider Covisint, a B2B platform operating in industries such as health care, automobiles, and financial services, which offers greater control to buyers in the bidding process. In contrast, Catex Global Exchange, an insurance B2B platform, focuses on the seller side and offers sellers specialized risk-management data and software, an electronic invoicing system, and network-building tools. Thus, asymmetric orientation can exist toward either side of the market. For consistency, we consider asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers in our study, unless otherwise noted.
Antecedents of Customer Orientation
Because platform-based exchange represents a system of dependence relationships, we rely on power-dependence theories (e.g., Emerson 1962) to identify the platform's dependence on marketplace participants as a key antecedent of its customer orientation. 4 A widely used gauge of dependence in interfirm contexts is market concentration: moreconcentrated markets are dominated by larger players, unlike less-concentrated markets (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . In a platform context, buyer (seller) concentration is the extent to which the platform's business disperses across buyers (sellers); as the number of buyers (sellers) decreases or their sizes increase, market concentration increases. When the concentration of buyers (sellers) increases, the platform's dependence on them increases as well. In turn, we expect dependence considerations to influence a platform's customer orientation decisions, in line with research that recognizes the relevance of market concentration for market orientation (Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Ramani and Kumar 2008) .
Beyond the direct dependence-based effect of buyer-(seller-) side concentration on a platform's customer orientation, we refer to contingency frameworks in the interfirm literature (Kim et al. 2011; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003) to predict that certain platform-specific contextual attributes-which are also viewed as key descriptors of a platform's business model in information systems research (Bakos 1991; Pavlou and El-Sawy 2002) -moderate the effect of buyer (seller) concentration. These contextual attributes are (1) one-and two-sided matching processes, (2) dynamic and static pricing, and (3) platform transaction fee structure. Specifically, the B2B relationships research in Customer Orientation Structure / 5 which our conceptualization is anchored has suggested the importance of incorporating these attributes in a study of interfirm systems such as B2B platforms. To elaborate, transaction cost (Williamson 1996) , agency theory (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) , and marketing (e.g., Heide 1994) literature streams have described three generic exchange conditions-performance ambiguity, market uncertainty, and switching costs-that are expected to influence a firm's customer management efforts. We posit that these three conditions are manifested as one-and two-sided matching, dynamic and static pricing, and transaction fee structures, respectively, on platforms.
One-and two-sided matching processes as performance ambiguity. Performance ambiguity refers to a firm's inability to gauge the quality of an exchange partner's abilities, motivations, and offerings (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006; Ouchi 1980) . In our context of B2B platforms, a particular type of performance ambiguity problem exists in the form of one-and two-sided customer matching processes. One-sided matching (e.g., auctions, reverse auctions) enables buyers and sellers to negotiate indirectly or anonymously through the platform interface, without revealing their identities to each other. In contrast, twosided matching (e.g., exchanges) enables buyers and sellers to interact directly and know each other's identities. Thus, ambiguity is higher for one-sided than for two-sided matching processes. 5 Dynamic and static price discovery process as market uncertainty. Market uncertainty refers to turbulence in the decision environment, which makes it difficult to predict future states or outcomes of a given exchange (Anderson 1985) . We operationalize uncertainty as dynamic and static pricing arrangements. Static pricing involves offerings sold at fixed prices (e.g., catalog aggregation), whereas dynamic pricing involves changing prices (e.g., bidding). Price changes are often a visible form of uncertainty to participants and indeed constitute a key element of any platform's business model (Haruvy and Jap 2012) . Dynamic pricing creates uncertainty about actual prices and participants' individual outcomes: buyers perceive a greater risk of overpaying, and sellers fear not getting the desired amount for their offerings. The possibility that some participants collude to manipulate prices (i.e., shilling; Kauffman and Wood 2005) also cannot be ruled out with dynamic pricing.
Proportion of transaction-driven fees as switching costs. Switching costs refer to the costs incurred to replace a focal product, brand, or exchange partner (Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi 2010; Monteverde and Teece 1982) . Prior research (e.g., Day, Fein, and Ruppersberger 2003) has identified a key manifestation of switching costs in a platform setting-namely, the proportion of transaction-driven fees (i.e., fees paid on a transaction basis by the participants as a ratio of the total dollar value of each transaction). The magnitude of fixed fees can be a metric for switching costs, but because firms vary in their operations, size, and resources, scaling fixed fees by the total fees offers a comparable metric of switching costs for firms of distinct sizes in different industries (e.g., Adebanjo 2010) . Fees charged by platforms can involve (1) transaction-based fees that vary with the level of activity of the buyer or seller and (2) fixed fees, such as for subscriptions or licenses that buyers and sellers pay for the right to participate on the platform. As the proportion of fixed component increases, participants face progressively greater switching costs because if they changed platforms, they would sacrifice the subscription fee. In contrast, as the proportion of transaction-based fees increases, participants face lower switching costs (Kambil and Van Heck 2002) .
Research Hypotheses
Antecedents of Total Customer Orientation
Buyer (seller) concentration. With increasing buyer concentration, each individual buyer represents a more substantial share of the transactions on the platform, which then becomes progressively more dependent on fewer buyers. As such, the platform is vulnerable to concentrated buyers that are in a position to wrest special concessions from it (Kumar, Heide, and Wathne 1998; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007) . One approach to managing powerful partners is by appeasing them through additional inducements or exchange benefits (Cook et al. 2013) . These benefits reduce a focal firm's relative dependence on a powerful partner because partners that abuse their power stand to lose these benefits if the focal firm terminates the relationship (Emerson 1962) . Thus, a platform might manage its dependence on concentrated buyers by increasing its total customer orientation (i.e., augmenting the quality of service or the transaction experiences available to all platform customers; McIvor and Humphreys 2004) . For example, the platform might establish a superior returns system selectively for the powerful buyers (keeping customer orientation constant on the seller side), or it might invest in market-wide infrastructure (e.g., new trading software), which can simultaneously benefit both sides. By cultivating favorable market perceptions of its customer orientation, the platform not only appeases buyers but also attracts and retains quality sellers, which is a key benefit buyers seek. Therefore, increasing buyer concentration should enhance a platform's reliance on total customer orientation as a dependence management strategy. (Although a platform's customer base includes both buyers and sellers, for brevity, we state our hypotheses for the buyer side; parallel predictions apply to seller concentration, and we test them as well.) Formally, we propose the following:
As buyer (seller) concentration increases, the platform firm's total customer orientation increases.
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Buyer (seller) concentration with matching processes as performance ambiguity. The matching process should moderate the effect of buyer (seller) concentration on total customer orientation. In other words, buyers benefit from lower levels of ambiguity about sellers in a two-sided matching process (i.e., when the two sides are not anonymous to each other and can interact and negotiate directly) than they do in a one-sided matching process (i.e., when the two sides are anonymous and cannot interact or negotiate directly). Therefore, we predict that two-sided matching results in more predictable transaction experiences for buyers than a one-sided matching process (Haruvy and Jap 2012; Niederle, Roth, and Sonmez 2008) . To the degree that buyers value such predictability in transactions (Anderson 1985; Ouchi 1980) , even with increasing buyer concentration, buyers are less likely to exploit the platform's dependence for a two-than for a one-sided matching process. Thus, the platform's need to engage in dependence management actions-specifically, by cultivating greater total customer orientation in response to increasing buyer concentration (per H 1a )-should be lower for two-sided than for onesided matching processes. We posit the following:
The positive effect of buyer (seller) concentration on total customer orientation is smaller for a two-sided matching process than for a one-sided matching process.
Buyer (seller) concentration with price discovery processes as market uncertainty.
A dynamic price discovery process entails greater market uncertainty for buyers than a static process (Choudhury, Hartzel, and Konsynski 1998; Lee 1998) , so buyers should be more reluctant to participate in markets with dynamic pricing than in those with static pricing. From the platform's perspective, such reluctance is more consequential with increasing buyer concentration; specifically, given a platform's increasing dependence on buyers as buyer concentration increases, the reluctance of these buyers to participate on the platform can severely impede the platform's performance. Consistent with this reasoning, substantial research (e.g., Buvik and John 2000; Foss and Laursen 2005; Gatignon and Anderson 1988) has shown how uncertainty can exacerbate the deleterious effects of dependence on performance. Thus, as a dependence management strategy, a platform should increase its total customer orientation to a greater degree with increasing buyer concentration (per H 1a ) when price discovery is dynamic as opposed to static. Formally,
The positive effect of buyer (seller) concentration on total customer orientation is larger for a dynamic versus a static price discovery process.
Buyer (seller) concentration with proportion of transaction-driven fees as switching costs. Transactiondriven fees capture the degree of lock-in faced by the platform's customers, so as their proportion increases (and the share of fixed fees diminishes), a buyer's cost of switching to another platform decreases (Day, Fein, and Ruppersberger 2003; Wang and Benaroch 2004) . With increasing buyer concentration, the platform's dependence on those buyers increases; such buyers are all the more in a position to exploit the platform's dependence without fearing significant consequences as the switching costs they face decrease (Bakos 1991; Ganesan et al. 2010) . Thus, the joint presence of increasing buyer concentration and decreasing switching costs should increase the platform's dependence on buyers; in turn, the joint effect of increasing buyer concentration and decreasing switching costs should be to increase the platform's reliance on total customer orientation as a dependence management strategy. Formally stated, H 1d : The positive effect of buyer (seller) concentration on total customer orientation increases with the proportion of transaction-driven fees.
Antecedents of Customer Orientation Asymmetry
Buyer (seller) concentration. Platforms invest in customer orientation toward both buyer and seller sides; however, investments made on each side of the marketplace involve "localized" and "tacit" content (Citrin, Wuyts, and Rindfleisch 2007, p. 9) tailored to each specific side. For example, as a part of its buyer-side orientation efforts, the Ariba platform has built an extensive database of buyer firms, developed best practices to serve buyers, and trained its staff to handle buyers' complaints; these investments are specialized to the buyer side. At the same time, Ariba's Supplier Membership Program offers functionalities such as contract management, receivables management, and lead generation tools, which are tailored only to the seller side. As this example suggests, platforms make separate customer orientation investments on buyer and seller sides, and many of these investments are specialized to the side in question. However, it is not apparent whether greater investments should focus on the buyer side or the seller side when buyer concentration increases; we explore this issue of asymmetric orientation next. 6 First, as buyer concentration increases, the platform's dependence on buyers increases as well, which in turn heightens the likelihood that buyers will extract undue concessions from the platform. In such situations, increasing customer orientation efforts toward the buyer side could appease buyers, as we argued previously. However, it also creates a risk of unintentionally deepening the platform's dependence on the buyers even further as a result of the idiosyncratic customer orientation investments toward the buyer side, which locks in the platform with the buyers (Hart and Saunders 1997; Williamson 1996) . Empirical evidence has suggested that although such investments can produce favorable relationship outcomes (Anderson and Weitz 1992) , they could also be exploited, particularly when the partner in question is powerful to begin with (Heide and John 1988; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) . Thus, as buyer concentration increases, increasing customer Customer Orientation Structure / 7 orientation-though beneficial in terms of appeasing the powerful buyers-might not by itself be sufficient for managing dependence. Emerson (1962) suggests that a "fundamental" (p. 35) strategy to manage powerful partners is dependence balancing, which involves the "diffusion of dependency into new relations" (p. 37) by strengthening relationships with other parties in the firm's network. Bacharach and Lawler (1981) demonstrate experimentally that power-disadvantaged actors are more likely to engage in dependence balancing than appeasement actions toward the powerful partner (see also Lawler and Yoon 1993) ; Skinner and Guiltinan (1986) also show similar results in a marketing channels context. Bae and Gargiulo (2004) document that instead of appeasing powerful alliance partners, telecommunication firms actively invest in third-party ties to gain "indirect leverage" (p. 843) on the powerful partners and are "better off" following such dependence-balancing initiatives. Anderson and Coughlan (2002) state that salespeople achieve leverage over powerful principals by "cultivating strong ties with the principal's customers" (p. 238), which the authors view as a "key element" (p. 240) of any dependence management strategy.
Following these perspectives, we propose that a platform can effectively manage its dependence, even with increasing buyer concentration, by purposely investing more on the seller side than on the buyer side. 7 To the degree that the seller-side customer orientation efforts are tailored to sellers, these investments are likely to be viewed by sellers as valuable benefits and credible signals of the platform's seriousness toward sellers (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) . Thus, seller-side customer investments should bond sellers with the platform and limit buyers' access to these sellers through alternative avenues (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000) . In turn, even as buyer concentration increases, to the degree that the buyers desire continued access to the sellers, buyers are less likely to 6 Customer orientation asymmetry can be operationalized to refer to either side, but we focus on asymmetry in favor of sellers, which we compute as seller-side orientation minus buyer-side orientation. Customer orientation asymmetry is a continuous variable, so all effects should simply reverse when the operationalization is reversed (i.e., buyer orientation minus seller orientation). Asymmetry and total orientation can increase jointly because the platform can increase customer orientation toward both sides while also increasing orientation toward one side more than the other. 7 Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1996) likewise holds that firms that fear exploitation by powerful partners can, instead of further deepening their lock-in, balance dependence by exiting market exchange through vertical integration. Fundamentally, vertical integration can be viewed as a type of dependence-balancing initiative whereby a market relationship is replaced with an alternative relationship-namely, the hierarchy. When vertical integration is infeasible or undesirable, dependence balancing can be accomplished by cultivating alternative market relationships. Thus, Liker and Choi (2004) describe the case of Japanese carmakers that routinely multisource to limit their dependence (lockin) on a single vendor. Similarly, we contend that a platform that has customized customer orientation investments to the powerful buyer side might be exploited further because it focuses more deeply on the buyers; instead, the platform could strengthen alternative relationships-namely, the other side of the marketplace.
8 Our claim here is that, given a choice, the platform likely should be asymmetrically oriented in favor of sellers relative to powerful buyers. In many cases, this would mean that the platform keeps buyer-side customer orientation constant; however, in other cases it could also mean that the platform increases its orientation toward buyers relative to its existing levels to appease buyers while also investing more toward sellers relative to buyers as a dependence-balancing strategy.
exploit the platform's dependence. 8 Consistent with this argument, Heide and John (1988) show that manufacturer agents balance dependence on powerful suppliers by bonding with downstream buyers, and Bensaou and Anderson (1999) discuss the role of buyer-specific investments in counteracting powerful sellers in industrial markets. In a platform context, Manchanda and Chu (2013) state that platforms such as Taobao.com pay more attention to one side of the marketplace with the intent of managing the marketplace effectively (see also Wang and Benaroch 2004) . Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H 2a : As buyer concentration increases, the platform firm's customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers also increases. 9
Buyer (seller) concentration with matching processes as performance ambiguity. The matching process captures performance ambiguity (Ouchi 1980) and should moderate the influence of buyer concentration on customer orientation asymmetry because the dependence-balancing strategy of bonding sellers to the platform can be more effective for one-sided than for two-sided matching processes. Without the direct buyer-seller interactions that are available in a two-sided matching process, sellers experience greater ambiguity about buyer credentials and motivations with one-sided than with two-sided matching (Gebauer and Mahoney 2014; Pavlou and El-Sawy 2002) . Therefore, sellers should value the platform's customer orientation efforts more for a one-sided than for a two-sided matching process, and platform customer orientation efforts likely prove more effective at attracting and retaining sellers with one-than with two-sided matching. 10 As such, platforms are less likely to engage in asymmetric orientation in favor of sell-
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ers for dependence-balancing purposes (in response to increasing buyer concentration, per H 2a ) with two-sided matching than with one-sided matching. That is, H 2b : The positive effect of buyer concentration on customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers is weaker when the matching process is two sided versus one sided.
Buyer (seller) concentration with price discovery processes as market uncertainty. Compared with a static price discovery process, sellers face greater uncertainty in exchange with a dynamic price discovery process (Anand and Aaron 2003; Wang and Benaroch 2004) and, thus, are more likely to suspect opportunistic buyer behavior (Carter and Stevens 2007) ; this is especially true as buyer concentration increases and buyers become progressively more dominant relative to sellers (Jap 2003 (Jap , 2007 . Thus, compared with a static price discovery process, sellers should value the platform's customer orientation efforts more under dynamic price discovery because such efforts signal the platform's readiness to protect sellers' interests. The platform's motivation to balance its dependence on concentrated buyers by bonding with sellers through customer orientation asymmetry favoring sellers (per H 2a ) then should be greater with dynamic than with static price discovery. Formally,
The positive effect of buyer concentration on customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers is larger when the price discovery process is dynamic as opposed to static.
Buyer (seller) concentration with proportion of transaction-driven fees as switching costs .
As the proportion of transaction-driven fees decreases (and the share of fixed fees increases), switching costs for participants increase. In this scenario, given increasing buyer concentration, the need for the platform to balance its dependence on buyers by cultivating greater customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers (per H 2a ) decreases because buyers are increasingly locked in with the platform due to their rising switching costs. If such buyers were to exploit the platform's dependence in the face of increasing switching costs, the platform could retaliate in subsequent interactions and impose consequences (Antia and Frazier 2001; Axelrod 1984) . In contrast, as the proportion of transaction-driven fees increase (and the share of fixed fees reduces), switching costs for participants decline; in this situation, given increasing buyer concentration, buyers are increasingly in a position to exploit the platform's dependence, which in turn heightens the platform's need for dependence balancing through increased customer orientation efforts toward sellers. Thus, H 2d : The positive effect of buyer concentration on customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers increases as the proportion of transaction-driven fees increases.
Performance Consequences of Customer Orientation Structure
To explore the performance implications of our theory, we link platform customer orientation to platform performance, or the extent to which the platform meets its financial and 9 A clarification is in order: we have argued that as a baseline scenario, increasing customer orientation investments on any (say, buyer) side should create a bonding effect by signaling the platform's seriousness toward the platform's customers (H 1a ). However, as buyer concentration increases, such idiosyncratic investments might also create a risk of exploitation, so the platform should orient itself asymmetrically toward the seller side to balance its dependence on concentrated buyers (H 2a ). Increasing orientation toward sellers, to the extent that it bonds quality sellers to the focal platform, is also likely to appease the buyer side, whose key interest in joining a platform is to obtain access to high-quality sellers. Thus, asymmetric orientation toward sellers can appease powerful buyers without raising the risk of exploitation by them. In contrast, given increasing buyer concentration, although buyers may be appeased by asymmetric orientation toward them (which exacerbates the potential for exploitation by locking in the platform with them), such an orientation might not facilitate dependence management as effectively. Thus, a platform's specialized customer orientation investments can trigger both exploitation and bonding responses by marketplace participants, contingent on concentration of the relevant side of the market (e.g., Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) . 10 In contrast, we do not expect greater orientation efforts toward buyers as buyer concentration increases, because these buyers are in a position to exploit the platform's customer orientation (H 2a ). Indeed, exploitation by powerful buyers is more likely in a onethan a two-sided matching process because one-sided matching generates greater levels of performance ambiguity for buyers as well, which could motivate them to exploit the dependent platform to achieve favorable terms and safeguard their interests. strategic objectives. Specifically, we examine whether platform firms that craft their customer orientation structure in a manner consistent with our hypotheses experience superior performance.
With respect to total customer orientation, prior research has argued and empirically documented a positive link between customer orientation and firm performance (Homburg, Muller, and Klarmann 2011; Narver and Slater 1990; Voss and Voss 2000) . Consistent with this research, we have contended that a platform's customer orientation involves various resource investments that are tailored to a specific side of the platform. These customer-oriented efforts offer important transaction utilities to participants (e.g., a superior exchange interface) while also signaling the platform's supportive intentions toward participants. Thus, a greater total customer orientation of the platform should lower its customer retention costs and enhance the value (e.g., sales, profits) it derives from customers (Gupta and Lehmann 2005; Kumar and Reinartz 2012) , leading to enhanced platform firm performance. Thus, we propose the following:
H 3 : An increase in a platform firm's total customer orientation enhances its performance.
In H 1a we posit that increasing buyer concentration enhances total customer orientation, in line with the premise that platforms can manage their dependence on powerful buyers by offering incremental transaction efficiencies through increased total customer orientation. If, as we have argued, increasing total customer orientation in conjunction with increasing buyer concentration truly facilitates a platform's ability to manage dependence, the platform should, ceteris paribus, have superior perforCustomer Orientation Structure / 9 mance. Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggests that unbalanced (unilateral) dependence makes a firm vulnerable to exploitation (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010) , whereas balanced (bilateral) dependence improves exchange performance (Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007) . Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995, p. 349 ) note explicitly that proportionate dependence "discourages conflict" and makes the interests of the parties "convergent." Thus, to the degree that the joint effect of increase in total customer orientation and buyer concentration facilitates dependence management, it should enhance platform performance. We hypothesize the following:
The joint effect of platform total customer orientation and buyer concentration is to enhance platform firm performance.
If increasing buyer concentration heightens customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers, as we predicted in H 2a (drawing on the notion that "bonding" with sellers can permit the platform to balance dependence on the increasingly concentrated buyer side), platform firms that are increasingly asymmetrically oriented toward sellers given increased buyer concentration (i.e., customer orientation asymmetry ¥ buyer concentration interaction) should have superior performance because successful dependence balancing is expected to enhance performance. Thus, H 5 : The joint effect of platform customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers and buyer concentration is to enhance platform firm performance.
We summarize our hypotheses in Figure 2 . 
Antecedent Model
Consequence Model
Method
Sample Selection and Data Collection
We gathered data directly from platform firms because our field interviews suggested that marketplace participants were unlikely to be fully aware of a platform's performance (dependent variable) or customer orientation efforts toward the other side (independent variable). We compiled a list of Internet-based platform firms from a comprehensive directory (dir.yahoo.com) and the online magazine B2Byellowpages. com. The former lists Internet-based platform firms that serve single industries (e.g., www.buzzsaw.com, which serves the construction industry). The latter lists all types of Internet-based platform firms, ranging from auctions to catalog aggregators. We combined information from multiple sources because no consolidated calling list of platform firms is available. Our initial sampling frame consisted of 572 Internet-based platform firms that serve B2B markets, including infrastructure providers (e.g., www.bidnet.com) and industry-sponsored marketplaces (e.g., www.virtualchip. com). We visited the websites of all these firms to confirm their existence and address. We then contacted each firm by telephone to locate willing, knowledgeable informants (i.e., members of the executive team who are responsible for key decisions); we made up to three contact attempts for each firm. In 70% of the cases, we spoke directly to chief executive officers or vice presidents, and in another 5%, these executives provided contact details for other suitable firms, creating a snowballing process. Ultimately, we obtained a feasible sample of 428 platform firms.
We contacted the prospective informants to request their participation and mailed them a questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the purpose our study, and a self-addressed return envelope. We specifically instructed informants to respond with respect to their electronic marketplace. To account for the (unlikely) possibility of clustering if a plat-
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form firm owned multiple marketplaces, we requested informants to complete separate questionnaires for each marketplace or, if that was infeasible, to complete one questionnaire with respect to a typical marketplace. As an incentive, we promised a summary of the key findings to all respondents. Follow-up survey packets were mailed to nonrespondents after three weeks, and the enclosed letter reemphasized the importance of Internet-based platform firms and the substantive significance of our study. Ultimately, we obtained 114 returns for a 27% response rate, and 109 returns contained usable data. Because our sampling frame came from sources that specifically listed B2B businesses (e.g., B2Byellowpages.com), only B2B platforms are included in our sample; we also cross-checked each response to confirm this.
A comparison of early and late respondents indicated no significant differences for key variables, including various demographic measures such as annual sales, firm age, and number of employees (p > .10). Thus, response bias seems unlikely in our data.
Measures
We adopted established scales for some constructs (e.g., performance) and created new measures for others (e.g., customer orientation components, customer concentration, price discovery process, buyer-seller matching process). For the new constructs, we adapted some established scales with conceptual links to our constructs and developed new items from in-depth (45-to 60-minute) field interviews with four platform executives. To finalize the measurement items, we applied an iterative procedure in which two doctoral students identified any ambiguous items and two ecommerce consultants evaluated the items for content relevance, format suitability, and clarity. We report the descriptive statistics in Table 2 and the measures in the Appendix. Notes: TCO = total customer orientation, COA = customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers (i.e., orientation toward sellers minus orientation toward buyers), PERF = platform performance, BC = buyer-side concentration, SC = seller-side concentration, MP = two-sided buyer-seller matching process, PD = dynamic price discovery process, TF = proportion of revenue that is transaction based, SP = self-participation of the platform firm, ITC = information technology capabilities, IC = industry complexity, and SIZE = platform firm size. All numbers in boldface are statistically significant at either p < .05 or p < .10. N.A. = not applicable (variances not computed for dummy variables).
Total customer orientation. We obtained separate measures for the platform firm's orientations toward buyers and sellers. For orientation toward buyers, we adapted measures from Narver and Slater (1990) . Specific items included the extent to which the platform crafted its business objectives on the basis of buyer satisfaction, monitored its commitment to buyer needs, measured buyer satisfaction, and developed its strategy with an understanding of buyer needs. A similar scale measured orientation toward sellers. We then collated all the measurement items for buyer and seller orientation and averaged them to obtain a total customer orientation measure.
Customer orientation asymmetry. We subtracted buyer orientation from seller orientation to arrive at the measure of customer orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers. Prior research in the interfirm domain in which our work is anchored has used similar operationalizations for various customer-facing constructs (e.g., Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) . An increase in the value of this measure would suggest an increase in the platform firm's orientation toward sellers relative to buyers; a decrease implies an increase in its orientation toward buyers relative to sellers.
Platform performance. In line with extant research (e.g., Fang, Palmatier, and Grewal 2011), we employed multiple items to measure the financial and strategic performance of the B2B electronic marketplace. These items include return on investments, sales, profits, growth, and market share.
Customer concentration. We used parallel measures for buyer and seller concentration, in accordance with our definition of customer concentration and similar notions in prior research. For example, Morgan, Anderson, and Mittal (2005) conceptualize customer concentration as the fragmentation of a firm's business among customers and customer power, and Zeitz, Mittal, and McAuley (1999) use customer concentration to imply powerful and dominant customers. For buyer-side concentration, we used items that reflected the extent to which (1) fragmentation existed among buyers in the electronic marketplace (reverse coded), (2) buyers wielded power in the marketplace, (3) many buyers competed for seller contracts (reverse coded), and (4) a few buyers dominated the marketplace.
Buyer-seller matching process. Following extant theory (e.g., Gallaugher and Ramanathan 2002), we used a categorical measure for the matching process, coded as 1 if the electronic marketplace was an exchange and 0 otherwise. An exchange is the only form of marketplace that enables buyers and sellers to communicate and negotiate directly (Kambil and Van Heck 2002) . Therefore, a value of 1 indicated a two-sided matching process, and 0 indicated a onesided process.
Price discovery process. We coded the measure for price discovery process as 1 when transactions in the marketplace took place through a bidding process (e.g., auctions, reverse auctions), which entails evolving prices, and 0 for all other processes (e.g., catalog aggregators, work flow marketplaces), for which prices are predetermined (Pavlou and El-
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Sawy 2002). Thus, a value of 1 indicated a dynamic price discovery process, and 0 indicated a static process.
Proportion of transaction-driven fees.
We used the percentage of marketplace revenues that, according to the platform firms, came from individual, pay-per-use customer transactions (Sculley and Woods 2001) as a measure of the proportion of transaction-driven fees. On average, 36% of marketplace revenues were derived from transaction-based fees, and the rest came from fixed prepayments (e.g., subscription and license fees).
Control variables.
We controlled for whether the platform firm self-participated in the electronic marketplace as a buyer or seller, which could bias its orientation toward its own side of the market. We also controlled for the information technology (IT) capabilities of the platform firm, which can influence customer orientation behaviors and performance. To measure IT capabilities, we used a second-order construct that captured both IT infrastructure and IT skills. Moreover, we controlled for the complexity of the focal platform's industry, manifested as variability in the composition and behavior of marketplace participants. Finally, we incorporated the platform's firm size (log-transformed), which might correlate with our independent (e.g., customer orientation) and dependent (e.g., performance) variables, and whose exclusion could bias our estimated coefficients.
Measure Validation and Common Method Bias
Measure validation. We assessed the validity of our multi-item measures using a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The overall CFA model with all latent constructs (platform performance, orientation toward buyers, orientation toward sellers, buyer concentration, seller concentration, industry complexity, IT skills, and IT resources) produced an acceptable fit (c 2 194 = 177.72, root mean square error of approximation = .05, confirmatory fit index = .98, nonnormed fit index = .98). All items loaded substantively and were statistically significant (t > 1.96) on their latent factors. All composite scale reliabilities were acceptable (.94 for platform performance, .84 for orientation toward buyers, .82 for orientation toward sellers, .75 for buyer-side concentration, .73 for seller-side concentration, .91 for industry complexity, .94 for IT skills, and .88 for IT infrastructure). Thus, we have evidence of convergent validity. The average variance extracted exceeded the relevant squared correlations, in support of discriminant validity (average variance extracted = .58 for platform performance, .71 for orientation toward buyers, .72 for orientation toward sellers, .50 for buyer-side concentration, .52 for seller-side concentration, .88 for industry complexity, .83 for IT skills, and .82 for IT infrastructure). A second-order CFA for IT capabilities, with the first-order constructs of IT infrastructure and IT skills, also exhibited acceptable model fit (c 2 76 = 155.79, root mean square error of approximation = .05, confirmatory fit index = .97, nonnormed fit index = .95). Per Nunnally's (1978) methodology for reliability of linear composites of scales, we calculated the reliability of total customer orientation to be .81 and the reliability of customer orientation asymmetry to be .72.
Common method variance. To alleviate common method concerns, we first applied Harman's single-factor test. We estimated a model involving all our latent constructs. The scree plot explained 88% of the variance, but no common factor emerged. The unrotated component matrix showed that the scale items did not load on a single construct; the rotated factor-loading matrix indicated that items for different constructs loaded uniquely on different factors.
Second, we used the marker variable technique specified by Lindell and Whitney (2001) . The second-lowest observed positive correlation in the correlation matrix is a reasonable proxy of common method variance (CMV); if adjusting for CMV does not substantially alter the observed correlations, CMV is unlikely to be substantial. The secondlowest correlation coefficient in our data was .02, and adjusting observed correlations did not result in any statistically significant difference between the observed and adjusted correlation coefficients.
Third, we employed a general factor covariate technique (Bemmels 1994) . After conducting an exploratory factor analysis of all scale items, we noted the factor score for the first unrotated factor, which should serve as a reasonable proxy for CMV. We used this factor score as a covariate in our focal regression models (which we describe subsequently). The regression coefficients of interest did not change in direction or statistical significance. Thus, CMV did not seem to be a major issue for our measurement model.
Model and Estimation
To test our conceptual framework, we specified our antecedent model first and then the consequences model. The antecedent model contained two equations to capture the effects of customer concentration, buyer-selling matching process, price discovery process, and proportion of transaction-driven fees on total customer orientation (Equation 1) and customer orientation asymmetry in favor of sellers relative to buyers (Equation 2). That is, toward sellers relative to buyers, BC f is buyer-side concentration, SC f is seller-side concentration, MP f is the buyerseller matching process, PD f is the price discovery process, TF f is proportion of transaction-driven fees, CONTROL includes all control variables, b 0, TCO and b 0, COA are intercepts, and e TCO, f and e COA, f are error terms.
The consequences model included the effects of total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry on platform performance: where PFP f is platform performance, b 0, PFP is the intercept, e PFP, f is the error term, and all other variables are defined as in Equations 1 and 2. Although we did not offer a specific prediction for the TCO ¥ COA interaction, we include this term to investigate the possible interaction effects.
Endogeneity
We constructed our empirical model in two stages. First, we estimated the two antecedent regression equations. Because Equations 1 and 2 have the same predictors, ordinary least square estimates are unbiased and efficient, so we can estimate each equation separately and do not need to resort to generalized least squares estimation.
In the second stage, we considered the possibility that the orientation constructs in the consequences model (Equation 3) were endogenous because the decisions about total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry might have involved some anticipation of performance outcomes. We employ Garen's (1988) correction to correct for the potential endogeneity bias in total customer orientation and customer orientation asymmetry in Equation 3. For this correction, we used the estimated residuals from Equations 1 and 2 (i.e., ê TCO, f and ê COA, f ) and added them as predictors in Equation 3. We also included the products of ê TCO, f and TCO f and of ê COA, f and COA f . This approach is preferable for continuous endogenous variables because unlike discrete variables (which possess only high and low levels), each level of a continuous variable is influenced by unobserved factors and requires correction.
Accounting for Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity
Pooling all platform firms for an aggregate analysis would mask any variance in the relationships between our focal variables that arises due to the unique context of each firm. Although we can control for some sources of firm heterogeneity by including observable, firm-specific covariates (e.g., firm size), most heterogeneity remains unobserved, which can be a source of omitted variable bias and lead to biased, inconsistent coefficient estimates (Chintagunta 2001) . To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we allow each of the three intercepts (b 0, TCO , b 0, COA , and b 0, PFP ) to differ across unobserved latent classes. Our semiparametric approach employs a latent class specification with a finite number of support points for the intercept term (Heckman and Singer 1984) , so the estimates of the intercepts differ across unobserved latent classes (Chintagunta 2001; Wedel, Kamakura, and Bockenholt 2000) . To incorporate multiple latent classes on the intercept term, we used the following generic form to replace Equations 1, 2, and 3:
where y f represents the generic form for dependent variable, X f is the generic form for covariates, b represents the generic form for parameter estimates of covariates, and e f represents the residuals. The intercept, p, which is allowed to vary across latent classes, as noted previously, can take the value of a finite number of discrete (Bernoulli) support points p 1 , ..., p K ; the indicator function I{} is 1 for all f OE k, and 0 otherwise. In our estimation, we allow the number of latent classes k to increase until the information criteria suggest otherwise (Wedel, Kamakura, and Bockenholt 2000) .
Results
We mean-centered all predictor variables except buyerseller matching process and price discovery process, which we operationalized as dummy variables. We estimated
regression Equations 1-3 using a latent class regression method. Only the intercepts were allowed to vary by latent class; all the other parameter estimates were independent of latent class (i.e., did not vary by latent class). We maximized the log-likelihood function of each equation using 5,000 iterations of the expectation-maximization algorithm so that it converged to a global maximum independent of the starting values (Muthén and Muthén 2007) . Our measure of model fit, the modified Akaike information criterion (MAIC), suggested that the four-class solution for the intercept was optimal because the MAIC reduced up to four classes (regimes) and increased thereafter (Equation (Celeux and Soromenho 1996) . We provide the results for the antecedent hypotheses (H 1a -H 2d ) in Table 3 and those for the consequences hypotheses (H 3 -H 5 ) in Table 4 .
First-Stage Antecedent Model
H 1a suggests that buyer and seller concentration are key antecedents to a platform's total customer orientation. As shown in Table 3 , this prediction is supported: the slopes of a Represents customer orientation asymmetry in favor of sellers relative to buyers. Notes: We used one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects and two-tailed tests for nonhypothesized effects. Only intercepts were allowed to vary by latent classes; all other coefficients were independent of latent classes. Because the intercepts vary by classes and a four-class solution was optimal, we do not explicitly list the intercepts in this table, but we obtained the following intercepts for the four classes: total customer orientation (Class 1: -.92, p < .1; Class 2: 3.87, p < .01; Class 3: 5.56, p < .01; Class 4: 3.45, p < .01); customer orientation (Class 1: -.51, p > .1; Class 2: .23, p > .1; Class 3: 2.47, p < .01; Class 4: -3.04, p < .01). The R-square values reflect the fit of the overall latent class regression model.
both buyer (b = .15, p < .01) and seller (b = .12, p < .01) concentration on total customer orientation are positive. We interpret these main effects of buyer (seller) concentration in light of the fact that two of our theoretically relevant predictors (i.e., buyer-seller matching process and price discovery 14 / Journal of Marketing, September 2014 process) are operationalized as dummy variables, which, unlike other predictor variables, are not mean-centered. As such, instead of an overall main effect, we separately examine the effects of buyer (seller) concentration at each of the two levels (0, 1) of buyer-seller matching process and price discovery process. Applying Wald tests (Wooldridge 2010) , in Table 4 , Panels A and B, we provide separate effects of buyer and seller concentration at each level of the two predictor variables. We find (see Table 4 13, p < .10). Overall, H 1a is supported in seven of eight cases. Substantively, these results imply that a platform firm's total orientation is crafted partly in response to customer concentration, as predicted by H 1a .
In H 1b we predicted that the positive influence of concentration on total customer orientation would be weaker for two-than for one-sided matching processes. As we depict in Table 3 , the interaction of the matching process with buyer concentration (b = -.06, p < .01) and with seller concentration (b = -.10, p < .01) were both negative, in support of H 1b. We graphically depict these interaction effects in Figure 3 , Panels A and B, by plotting the effects (slopes) of buyer concentration on total customer orientation for different levels of the moderator-namely, for two-sided and one-sided matching processes. We also find support for H 1c , which proposes that the interactions of dynamic price discovery process with buyer concentration (b = .24, p < .01) and seller concentration (b = .11, p < .01) both enhance total customer orientation (Table 3 ; for a graphical depiction of these interactions, see Figure 3 , Panels C and D). However, we did not find support for moderating effects of the proportion of transaction-driven fees (H 1d ) on the effects of buyer (b = .001, p > .10) or seller (b = -.005, p > .10) concentration on total customer orientation. These results support our broad contention that platforms rely on total orientation to manage dependence on powerful market participants, in light of their particular transaction attributes (e.g., matching process).
In H 2a , we propose that buyer (seller) concentration would enhance (reduce) orientation asymmetry toward sellers relative to buyers; we found support for buyer concentration (b = .21, p < .01), but although the effect of seller concentration was in the expected direction, it was not significant (b = -.10, p > .10). In the absence of mean-centering the two predictor variables (buyer-seller matching process and price discovery process operationalized as dummy variables), we provide further details of the effects of buyer (seller) concentration at each of the two levels (0, 1) of buyer-seller matching process and price discovery process. As we hypothesized, we find that the effect of buyer concentration is positive and statistically significant at three of the four 0 and 1 combinations of the predictor variables ( 
Second-Stage Consequences Model
As Table 5 shows, total customer orientation positively influenced platform performance, in support of H 3 (b = 1.94, p < .01). H 4 is partially supported (for a graphical depiction, see Figure 5 ), in that the positive effect of total customer orientation on platform performance increased with seller concentration (b = .17, p < .05) but not with buyer concen-*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. Notes: SS = slope size, TCO = total customer orientation, and COA = customer orientation asymmetry. over buyers on platform performance was negative (b = -.09, p < .05). 11 Overall, these results imply that platform firms that align their dependence management strategy (as reflected in their customer orientation efforts) to their particular dependence situation (as captured through customer concentration) in a selective fashion have superior performance.
Discussion
Despite the ubiquity of B2B platforms and the professed importance of winning customers' hearts and minds (Chesbrough 2011) , research on how platforms should manage their customers has only just begun to emerge (Sawhney, Verona, and Prandelli 2005) . We conceptualize two aspects of platform customer orientation (total and asymmetry) and assess their validity with a framework that features both antecedents and consequences of platform firm customer orientation. The results from field data collected from electronic B2B platforms support our framework and suggest that a platform's customer orientation results from the interplay of dependence considerations (captured as customer concentration) and platform attributes and that it has distinct performance implications.
Limitations and Further Research
Although our study examines an important and novel topic in the marketing realm, it also suffers from limitations. First, we employed a unique data set, but practical limitations made it difficult to obtain "triadic" data jointly col-11 As a post hoc check, we contacted a few knowledgeable managers regarding their firms' experiences as buyers or sellers (eight in each role) on specific platforms. They were unaware of the platform's proprietary aspects (e.g., performance, customer efforts toward the other side) but also noted that they perceived platforms as asymmetrically oriented, especially toward the fragmented side. One manager described a metals platform that focused more on the fragmented buyer side (e.g., small construction contractors, machining mills) than on large steel manufacturers (sellers), offering technical consultation, credit management services, and reliable quality information. The platform's website emphasized the importance of transparency (to limit ambiguity in one-sided matching) and unbiased pricing (especially with price dynamism), which affirmed the practical significance of our theoretical variables. Another senior manager described a platform in the petroleum industry that attracted rig contractors (sellers) and rig operators (buyers). This informant noted that the seller side was more concentrated (seller-to-buyer ratio of 1:5), but the platform focused more on fragmented buyers that were easier to address. In another case, a manager noted that given the presence of buyers, the focal platform would actively search for appropriate sellers rather than let the buyers' needs go unmet. The platform implemented an escrow mechanism to protect buyers against seller fraud. These practitioner insights were consistent with our conceptualization and findings. lected from the platform, its buyer, and its sellers. Such data could have yielded novel insights. Furthermore, our meticulously gathered data on platform firms are, to our knowledge, distinctive in the marketing domain, but we must acknowledge the small sample sizes. We focused on certain antecedents of customer orientation, such as dependence (as captured through customer concentration) and exchange uncertainty (e.g., as reflected in the price discovery process), which have a strong precedent in marketing as descriptors of interfirm relationships (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007) . However, industry factors, power of buyers relative to sellers, and product complexity could all play roles. The notion of network effects (whereby the value of a platform to one side of the market increases with the number of participants on the other side) could also be investigated further. Relatedly, a deeper comparison of the appeasement and dependence-balancing perspectives would be valuable. Next, our notion of total and asymmetric orientation is adapted from the interfirm literature stream, but research is needed to ascertain whether they are the only components. Another question is whether the one-sidedness of the matching process is differentially consequential for the two sides.
Finally, platform exchange is distinct from the notion of multiple customer segments (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ). Although it was not our objective to compare platforms with multisegment markets, future studies should delve into such comparisons. Overall, we hope that further research will examine the influence of a larger set of variables on platform orientation.
Implications
We contribute to emerging research on platform firms, the rich body of scholarship on firm orientations, and the literature on B2B relationships. Platform firms have begun to attract attention from practitioners and management scholars (Chesbrough 2011 ), but they remain virtually unexplored in marketing research. Economists (e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2006) also have begun to examine platforms, though their focus remains confined mainly to pricing. To move beyond this position, we emphasize the role of other marketing variables, such as customer characteristics and customer orientation, which are "cornerstones" (Kohli and Jaworski 1990 , p. 1) of marketing thought and action. Our study suggests the need to examine a broad variety of marketing variables in platform contexts, similar to Evans and Schmalensee's (2010, p. 23) call for investigations of platforms' "non-pricing policies."
We focus specifically on how platform firms manage multiple sides of a marketplace whose joint interactions enable the platform to create value but whose priorities differ. Platforms operate efficiently in multisided markets by (1) nurturing total customer orientation toward the overall market and (2) inculcating differential orientations toward different sides of the marketplace. This conceptualization reflects the complexities inherent to customer management practices by platform firms; it also contributes to marketing theory pertaining to customer orientations. Extant literature *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. Notes: SS = slope size, TCO = total customer orientation, and COA = customer orientation asymmetry. (Narver and Slater 1990) offers key insights into the customer management practices of firms, but prior research has exclusively addressed one-sided markets. That is, researchers have focused on total orientation but overlooked the asymmetry aspect, which is manifested only in multisided markets. However, the presence of intermediating platforms in dyadic exchange relationships challenges traditional notions of customer orientation, so established notions of customer management practices should be reformulated to reflect the evolving nature of firms, from actor in dyadic exchange to orchestrators of complex, multisided buyer-seller networks. Drawing on interfirm relationship research, we show that exchange characteristics such as dependence and uncertainty can determine the orientation structure both individually and in complementary relationships with each other. Thus, both total and asymmetric orientations are strategic decision variables, chosen in response to focal antecedent conditions. Emerging research (Rochet and Tirole 2006) has noted that some, but not all, platforms focus on different sides of their marketplace, but the specific reasons for why platform firms might do so remains undocumented. We take an initial step by offering a specific rationale for the orientation structure, rooted in well-established theories of interfirm exchange (e.g., Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995, 1998) , and by providing empirical support for our theoretical account. Our study thus serves as a conceptual bridge between emerging research on platform organizations and established theories of interfirm relationships. In describing antecedents of orientation structure, we also integrate the nascent research on platforms with established thought pertaining to customer orientation.
Our research also reveals that platforms that structure their customer orientation in light of dependence considerations have superior performance. The findings regarding the beneficial effects of orientation asymmetry are relevant for the broader marketing strategy literature, which has tended to assume that a consistently high focus on all customers is desirable. In contrast, we argue that asymmetry can be harnessed purposefully and for productive purposes. At the same time, the effect of orientation asymmetry on platform performance varies with customer concentration, so asymmetry, if cultivated indiscriminately (e.g., with buyers who are concentrated), could have the unintended effect of undermining platform outcomes. These nuanced results regarding orientation asymmetry suggest the need for more specific theories that can explain irregularities in the consequences of firm orientations. Research is necessary to establish when asymmetry is beneficial or problematic and whether it has nonlinear effects on performance.
Our research also offers takeaways for practitioners. First, total orientation is a key lever that firms can manipulate to influence performance. Second, managers should carefully evaluate the contingencies that would enable them to harness the performance potential of total orientation. Total orientation likely supports performance with concentrated customers; platforms should benefit from focusing asymmetrically on sellers, but only when buyer concentration is increasing. Thus, firms must invest in customer oriCustomer Orientation Structure / 19 entation efforts selectively. Although prior research (Evans and Hagiu 2007, p. 62) has dismissed prescriptions to "build share fast" on the buyer side, our results suggest that such asymmetric orientation efforts might be beneficial in some conditions. Although the findings from the antecedent model do not directly address platform performance, they do suggest potential courses of action. First, a platform with concentrated buyers should focus asymmetrically on sellers. Second, platforms should tailor asymmetry in their orientation toward sellers (in response to buyer concentration) in accordance with their specific business model; they should focus more asymmetrically toward sellers when they use dynamic rather than static pricing and with one-sided rather than two-sided matching processes.
The ability to manage customers is central to what firms do (Kumar and Reinartz 2012) . Our framework, which focuses on a platform's ability to manage multisided buyerseller markets, is consistent with this view; in particular, it depicts the value-creating role of customer orientation elements. To the extent that fostering an appropriate orientation involves the assessment of multiple customer-(e.g., buyer concentration) and platform-(e.g., matching process) level considerations, customer orientation elements could provide a basis for enduring advantages for platform firms.
Appendix: Measures
Customer Orientation Toward Buyers
Please indicate your agreement with the following questions concerning the orientation of your electronic marketplace (1 = "disagree," and 7 = "agree"): B1. Our business objectives for the marketplace are primarily driven by buyer satisfaction. B2. We constantly measure our level of commitment to serving buyer needs. B3. We give close attention to servicing buyers. B4. Our marketplace strategy for competitive advantage is based on understanding of buyer needs. B5. We measure buyer satisfaction systematically and frequently.
Customer Orientation Toward Sellers
Please indicate your agreement with the following questions concerning the orientation of your electronic marketplace (1 = "disagree," and 7 = "agree"): S1. Our business objectives for the marketplace are primarily driven by seller satisfaction. S2. We constantly measure our level of commitment to serving seller needs. S3. We give close attention to servicing sellers. S4. Our marketplace strategy for competitive advantage is based on understanding of seller needs. S5. We measure seller satisfaction systematically and frequently.
Total Customer Orientation TCO = (B1 + B2 + B3 + B4 + B5 + S1 + S2 + S3 + S4 + S5)/10
Customer Orientation Asymmetry COA = [(S1 -B1) + (S2 -B2) + (S3 -B3) + (S4 -B4) + (S5 -B5)]/5
Platform Performance
Please rate aspects of the performance of your electronic marketplace (1 = "unsatisfactory," and 7 = "satisfactory"):
1. Return on investment relative to objective 2. Sales relative to objective 3. Profit relative to goals 4. Growth relative to objective 5. General success
Buyer-Side Concentration
Please indicate the accuracy of the following statements in describing aspects concerning buyer side of your electronic marketplace (1 = "disagree," and 7 = "agree"; r = reverse coded):
1. The buyer side of our marketplace can be characterized as fragmented (r). 2. In the marketplace, a large number of buyers compete with one another for seller contracts (r). 3. Buyers wield a lot of power in our marketplace. 4. A few large buyers dominate the marketplace.
Seller-Side Concentration
Please indicate the accuracy of the following statements in describing aspects concerning seller side of your electronic marketplace (1 = "disagree," and 7 = "agree"; r = reverse coded):
1. The seller side of our marketplace can be characterized as fragmented (r). 2. In the marketplace, a large number of sellers compete with one another for buyer contracts (r). 3. Sellers wield a lot of power in our marketplace. 4. A few large sellers dominate the marketplace.
Two-(vs. One-) Sided Matching Process and Dynamic (vs. Static) Pricing (Dummy Coded)
Please check the statement that accurately categorizes the business model of your marketplace: __ Catalogue Aggregator: The market maker aggregates catalogues (product offerings) of multiple vendors and sells to buyers at a static (fixed) price. __ Auction: Multiple buyers bid competitively for products from a single supplier. __ Reverse Auction: Buyers post their needs for products or services and suppliers bid competitively for fulfill the needs. __ Exchange: A marketplace where buyers and sellers interact to exchange information and engage in trade, facilitated through some negotiated dynamic pricing system (such as a bid and ask system).
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__ Lead Generator: A seller driven marketplace, where the market makers derives revenue from fixed commission on sales, or fixed fees for generating qualified sales leads for sellers. __ Workflow Marketplace: Provides project tracking or collaboration services for complex, iterative, multi-party projects (such as in construction) and charges fixed fees for its services. __ Other (To code the matching process, we used a dummy variable equal to 1 if the electronic marketplace was an exchange and 0 otherwise. To code the price discovery process, we used a dummy variable equal to 1 for auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges and 0 otherwise.)
Transaction Fee as Proportion of Total Revenue
Please indicate the percentage of your marketplace revenues that comes from the following:
Transaction fees __ %.
Platform Firm Self-Participation
Please check the statement that most accurately describes the operating status of the electronic marketplace you manage:
